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ABSTRACT 
 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Networks (MANETs) are becoming increasingly popular as more and more 
mobile devices find their way to the public. A crucial problem in Ad-Hoc networks is finding an 
efficient route between a source and a destination. Due to MANET’s inherent characteristics, 
secure routing may be one of the most difficult areas to tackle because opponents can add 
themselves to a MANET using the existing common routing protocols. Hence, this paper 
proposed a new model of routing protocol called ARANz, which is an extension of the original 
Authenticated Routing for Ad-Hoc Networks (ARAN). Apart from the authentication methods 
adopted from ARAN, ARANz aims to increase security, achieve robustness and solve the single 
point of failure and attack problems by introducing multiple Local Certificate Authority servers. 
Moreover, by dealing with the network as zones and using restricted directional flooding, our 
new model will exhibit better scalability and performance. An overview and a qualitative 
comparison between ARANz and some existing Ad-Hoc routing protocols is presented in this 
paper. 
 
Keywords: position-based routing, secure routing, scalable routing, ad-hoc networks, 
wireless networks. 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
 
Ad-Hoc wireless networks are self-organizing multi-hop wireless networks, where all the hosts 
(or nodes) take part in the process of forwarding packets. Ad-Hoc networks can quickly and 
inexpensively be set up as needed since they do not require any fixed infrastructure, such as base 
stations or routers. Therefore, they are highly applicable in many fields, such as emergency 
deployments and community networking. 
 
A key component of Ad-Hoc wireless network is an efficient routing protocol since all the nodes 
in the network act as routers. Ad-Hoc network routing protocols are difficult to design in general. 
There are two main reasons for that; the highly dynamic nature of the Ad-Hoc networks due to 
high mobility of the nodes, and the need to operate efficiently with limited resources such as 
network bandwidth, CPU processing capacity, memory and battery power of each individual 
node in the network. Moreover, the concept and structure of Ad-Hoc networks make them prone 
to easy attack through several ways such as modification, impersonation, and fabrication. 
 
Considering the Ad-Hoc networks environments, the managed-open environment is the one that 
we are most likely to see expanding in the nearest future. Such an Ad-Hoc network might be 
formed by peers at a conference, or students on a campus. In this type of environment, the 
possibility to use already established infrastructure to some extent to help us secure the Ad-Hoc 
network is available. This means that there is an opportunity for pre-deployment or exchange of 
public keys, session keys, or certificates. This opens up a whole new range of strategies that use 
certificate servers and other similar software to provide a starting point for the security in the 
network. 
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For example, without online trusted servers as in wired networks, it is difficult to be acquainted 
with the trustworthiness of each node, thus keeping away malicious nodes from the routes. 
However, the approach where one centralized server is used in the Ad-Hoc network is not 
practical as the server may also be mobile, hence it may be difficult for a node to connect to the 
server. In addition, the server could be the operation bottleneck as it may be just a normal Ad-
Hoc node with limited memory, CPU processing capacity and battery power. In order to address 
this problem, the position service system and the certificate authority should be distributed 
among a number of servers deployed in the network. 
 
The need for scalable and energy efficient protocols, along with the recent availability of small, 
inexpensive and  low power positioning instruments justify introducing position based routing 
algorithms in mobile Ad-Hoc networks. For the aforementioned reasons, it is a challenge to find 
a scalable, distributed and secure position-based routing protocol for Ad-Hoc networks. A new 
model of routing protocol, ARANz has been proposed in this work.   
 
This paper (which is a continuation of our work in [1] and [2]) discusses the new protocol 
ARANz and compares it to Ad-Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [3] and Authenticated 
Routing for Ad-Hoc Networks (ARAN) [4] protocols. The discussed protocols are compared with 
respect to their security, the used route discovery and path selection techniques, guaranteeing 
loop-freedom, the suitable network density to be implemented in, load distribution, the need of 
centralized trust and/or synchronization, robustness, implementation complexity, scalability, 
packet and processing overhead, route acquisition latency and data packets’ end-to-end delay. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the existing and recent works on 
Ad-Hoc routing protocols. Section 3 presents our new routing protocol. Sections 4 and 5 contain 
a qualitative comparison as well as analysis and discussion of AODV, ARAN and ARANz 
protocols. We conclude our work in Section 6.  Finally, we present our future direction in 
Section 7.  
 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
 
In this section we will discuss the existing and recent works on Ad-Hoc routing protocols. 
Subsections 2.2 and 2.3 give an overview about two particular protocol; AODV and ARAN 
protocols. 
 
2.1 Existing Works 
 
Several routing protocols have been proposed for mobile Ad-Hoc networks. In general, they can 
be divided into two main categories: topology-based and position-based. Topology-based 
routing protocols use information about links that exist in the network to perform packet 
forwarding. They are, in turn, divided into three categories: proactive, reactive, and hybrid 
(hierarchical) protocols. 
 
Proactive routing protocols periodically broadcast control messages in an attempt to have each 
node always know a current route to all destinations, and remove local routing entries if they 
time out. We observed that proactive routing protocols are less suitable for Ad-Hoc wireless 
networks because they constantly consume power throughout the network, regardless of the 
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presence of network activity. Also they are not designed to track topology changes occurring at a 
high rate [5][6]. 
 
On the other hand, reactive routing protocols are deemed more appropriate for wireless 
environments because they initiate a route discovery process only when data packets need to be 
routed. Many Ad-Hoc routing protocols that use reactive route determination have been 
developed such as AODV protocol. One advantage of reactive routing protocols is that no 
periodic routing packets are required.   However, they may have poor performance in terms of 
control overhead in networks with high mobility and heavy traffic loads. Scalability is said to be 
another disadvantage because they rely on blind broadcasts to discover routes [6]. 
 
As seen, proactive routing uses excess bandwidth to maintain routing information, while reactive 
routing involves long route request delays. Reactive routing also inefficiently floods the entire 
network for route determination. Hybrid routing protocols, such as Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) 
[5], aim to address these problems by combining the best properties of both approaches. The 
disadvantage of ZRP is that for large values of routing zone the protocol can behave like a pure 
proactive protocol, while for small values it behaves like a reactive protocol [7].  
 
In general, topology-based are considered not to scale in networks with more than several 
hundred nodes [8]. We note that none of the Ad-Hoc routing protocols mentioned above defined 
their security requirements and that they inherently trust all participants. Obviously, this could 
result in security vulnerabilities and exposures that could easily allow routing attacks [4][9][10]. 
 
Since then, many works were done on secure routing protocols such as ARAN, Secure Ad-Hoc 
On-demand Distance Vector (SAODV) [11] and ARIADNE [12]. Of particular is the ARAN 
protocol. Effectively, ARAN is similar to AODV, but provide authentication of route discovery, 
setup, and maintenance. The main objectives of ARAN are to detect and protect against attacks 
from malicious nodes in a managed-open environment where no network infrastructure is pre-
deployed, however it expects a small amount of prior security coordination. It also requires the 
use of a trusted certificate Authority server. In comparison to basic AODV, ARAN prevents a 
number of attacks such as modification, impersonation and fabrication exploits. We observed 
that although ARAN has good and equivalent performance to AODV, its route discovery process 
results in more packet overhead and higher latency since each packet must be signed. ARAN is 
also based on a centralized trust, hence, suffers from the compromised server problem and the 
single point of failure. ARAN does not scale well in large networks since any request packet is 
broadcasted to all nodes in the network.  
 
In recent developments, position-based routing protocols exhibit better scalability, performance, 
and robustness against frequent topological changes [8][13]. Position-based routing protocols use 
the geographical position of nodes to make routing decisions, which results in improving 
efficiency and performance. These protocols require that a node be able to obtain its own 
geographical position and the geographical position of the destination. Generally, this 
information is obtained via Global Positioning System (GPS) and location services. There  are  
different  kinds  of  position-based protocols  that  are  categorized  into  three  main  groups: 
Restricted  directional  flooding,  Greedy  and  hierarchical routing protocols. 
 
Most position-based protocols, such as Greedy Perimeter Stateless Routing (GPSR) [14], use 
greedy forwarding to route packets from a source to the destination. In greedy forwarding, a 
source node selects a neighboring node that is closest to the destination as the next hop. 
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Similarly, each intermediate node selects a next hop node until the packet reaches the 
destination. In order to enable the nodes to do this, nodes periodically broadcast small packets 
(called beacons) to announce their position and enable other nodes to maintain a one-hop 
neighbor table. Such an approach is scalable since it does not need routing discovery and 
maintenance [15]. However, periodic beaconing creates a lot of congestion in the network and 
consume the nodes’ energy [8][13]. In addition, Greedy forwarding in general may not always 
find the optimum route [15]. GPSR for example works well in dense networks, but in sparse 
networks greedy forwarding fails due to voids [14]. 
 
Location-Aided Routing (LAR) [16] is an example of restricted directional flooding routing 
protocols in which , the sender will broadcast the packet to all single hop neighbors towards the 
destination. In  the LAR  approach,  the  node  which  received  the  route request  message,  
compares  its  distance  to  the  destination, with the distance of the previous hop to the 
destination. If the receiver node is closer to the destination, it retransmits the route request 
message; otherwise, it will drop the message. In  order  to  find  the  shortest  path  in  the 
network level, instead of selecting a single node as the next hop,  several  nodes  will  be  
selected  for  managing  the  route request message and each of them will put its IP address in the 
header of the request packet (this will increase the size of the message). Therefore, the route 
through which the route request message is passed will be saved in the header of the message.  
 
TERMINODES [17] is an example of hierarchical routing protocols. TERMINODES presents a 
two level hierarchy within which, if the destination is close to the sender (in number of hops), 
packets will be routed based on a proactive distance vector. Greedy routing is used in long 
distance routing. 
 
All the aforementioned position-based routing protocols are vulnerable to various security 
attacks since they were not designed with security in mind [10].  With the exceptions of LAR, 
they have low probability to find the shortest path. 
 
Few secure position-based routing protocols have been proposed such as Secure Position Aided 
Ad-Hoc Routing (SPAAR) [18], Anonymous On-Demand Position-based Routing in Mobile Ad-
Hoc  Networks (AODPR) [10], and  Secure Geographic Forwarding (SGF) [19]. However they 
suffer from some problems; such as, the single point of failure and attack, increased packet and 
processing overhead, and/or scalability problems. 
 
From observations, we note that despite its popularities, many topology-based routing protocols 
still possess security vulnerabilities and are not scalable. Although some improvements on 
security aspects were proposed such as in ARAN, the implicit trust on centralized node has 
introduced other security problems. Like the others, ARAN does not scale well. Finally, 
restricted directional flooding has better performance than topology-based and other position-
based routing protocols.  
 
2.2 Overview of AODV Protocol 
 
Ad-Hoc On-demand Distance Vector (AODV) [3]  is classified as a pure on-demand route 
acquisition protocol, since nodes that are not on a selected path do not maintain routing 
information or participate in routing table exchanges. AODV offers a quick adaptation to 
dynamic link conditions, low processing, memory overhead, and low network utilization. It uses 
destination sequence numbers to ensure loop freedom at all times.  
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When a node requires a route to a destination, if the route is not available, the node initiates a 
route discovery process within the network. It broadcasts a Route Request Packet (RREQ) to its 
neighbors. Upon receipt of RREQ, the node creates a reverse routing entry towards the originator 
of RREQ, which is used to forward replies later. 
 
Once the request reaches the destination or an intermediate node with a fresh enough route, the 
destination or intermediate node responds by unicasting a Route REPly  packet (RREP) back to 
the neighbor from which it first received the request. Upon receipt of RREP, the reverse routing 
entry towards the originator of RREP is also created, similar to the processing of RREQ. A 
precursor list is associated with each routing entry, which is created at the same time. The 
precursor list contains the upstream nodes towards the same destinations. 
 
For route maintenance; every node along an active route periodically broadcasts HELLO 
messages to its neighbors. If the node does not receive a HELLO message or a data packet from 
a neighbor for a while, the link between itself and the neighbor is considered to be broken. If the 
destination is not far away (from the invalid routing entry), local repair mechanism may be 
launched to rebuild the route towards the destination; otherwise, a REER (Route Error) packet is 
sent to the neighbors in the precursor list associated with the routing entry to inform them of the 
link failure. 
 
2.3 Overview of ARAN Protocol 
 
Effectively, Authenticated Routing for Ad-Hoc Networks (ARAN) [4] protocol is similar to 
AODV. However, the former provides authentication of route discovery, setup, and 
maintenance. The main objectives of ARAN are to detect and protect against attacks from 
malicious nodes in a managed-open environment where no network infrastructure is pre-
deployed, however it expects a small amount of prior security coordination. It requires the use of 
a trusted Certificate Authority (CA) server whose public key is known by all valid nodes. Before 
entering the Ad-Hoc network each node requests a certificate from this CA. ARAN uses 
cryptographic certificates to prevent and detect most of the security attacks that most of the ad 
hoc routing protocols face. This protocol introduces authentication, message integrity and non-
repudiation as part of a minimal security policy for the Ad-Hoc environment.  
 
ARAN consists of a preliminary certification process followed by a route instantiation process 
that guarantees end-to-end authentication. Thus, the routing messages are authenticated end-to-
end and only authorized nodes participate at each hop between source and destination. 
 
Route discovery in ARAN is accomplished by broadcasting a Route Discovery Packet (RDP) 
from a source node which is replied to by a unicast REPly (REP) packet that is launched from 
the destination and sent back along the reverse path to the source. The routing messages are 
authenticated at each hop from source to destination, as well as on the reverse path from the 
destination to the source. Hence, every node that forwards a request or a reply must also sign it 
so that the following node can check the validity of the previous node. Because only the 
destination can send REPs, loop freedom is guaranteed easily. 
 
ARAN requires that nodes keep one routing table entry per source-destination pair that is 
currently active. This is certainly more costly than per-destination entries in non-secure Ad-Hoc 
routing protocols.  
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Although there is a greater performance cost to ARAN as compared to AODV, the increase in 
cost is minimal and outweighed by the increased security. Compared to basic AODV, ARAN 
prevents a number of attacks, including spoofing of route signaling messages, alteration of 
routing messages and replay attacks. Moreover, simulation results in [4] show that ARAN has a 
good performance, equivalent to AODV, in discovering and maintaining routes. On the other 
hand, besides its problems in handling scalability with the number of nodes (that are inherited by 
AODV) it causes more packet overhead and higher latency in route discovery since each packet 
must be signed. Finally, ARAN uses one certificate server and this leads to an extreme need to 
keep this server uncompromised. 
 
3.0 PROPOSED PROTOCOL 
 
In this section, we propose a new routing model called ARANz. The proposed protocol was 
called ARANz since it adopts the authentication steps used with the ARAN protocol and deals 
with the network as zones.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
ARANz, just like ARAN, uses cryptographic certificates to prevent most of the attacks against 
Ad-Hoc routing protocols and detect erratic behavior. However, ARANz introduces a hierarchal 
distributed routing algorithm, which aims to improve performance of the routing protocol and 
distribute load by dividing the area into zones. Moreover it tries to achieve robustness and high 
level of security, solve the single point of failure problem and avoid single point of attack 
problem by distributing trust among multiple Local Certificate Authority (LCA) servers. Each 
zone has multiple LCAs that should collaborate with each other to issue certificates for the nodes 
inside that zone and work as backups of each other. If a misbehavior detection scheme is present 
on the network, then the security of  the protocol can be improved through collaboration with 
this scheme. 
 
Moreover, ARANz tries to exhibit better scalability, performance, and robustness against 
frequent topological changes by taking advantage of the idea of restricted directional flooding 
position-based routing protocols. Whenever a node needs to communicate with another , the 
former will get the latter’s position through the LCAs of its zone, then the route request packet is 
sent using restricted directional flooding. This helps in reducing overall overhead and saving 
network bandwidth. Hence, the LCAs work also as Position Servers; and each node should tell 
the LCAs of its zone about its new position if it has moved at a rate proportional to its speed. 
 
ARANz consists mainly of five phases which are network setup, network maintenance, location 
service, route instantiation and maintenance and finally data transmission. Network setup 
includes certifying trusted nodes, dividing area into zones and electing initial certificate authority 
servers. Network maintenance phase copes with ensuring maintenance of the network structure 
taking into consideration some issues like updating nodes’ certificates, LCAs synchronization, 
movements of nodes in and out the network as well as corrupted and destroyed nodes.  
 
Whenever a node has data to be sent to a particular destination; it is supposed to obtain the 
destination’s position before beginning the route discovery process. Location service phase 
enables the source to obtain the destination’s position via communicating LCAs in its zone. After 
getting the destination’s position route, the instantiation and maintenance phase is initiated. The 
source begins route discovery to destination by sending a Route Discovery Packet (RDP). This is 
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done using restricted directional flooding towards the destination node. Upon receiving the first 
RDP, destination unicasts a Route REPly (RREP) packet back along the reverse path to the 
source to setup the route. After finishing route discovery and setup the source begins sending the 
data to the destination. In order to maintain the selected route, nodes in ARANz keep track of 
whether routes are active or not and use ERRor (ERR) packets to report links in active routes 
that are broken due to node movement.  
 
Since each node by the end of the network setup phase has its own certificate, these certificates 
can be used to apply the authentication steps used with ARAN protocol. Hence the source of any 
packet and all intermediate nodes sign the packet using their private keys and append their 
certificates to the packets. Also, each intermediate node, as well as the destination, validates the 
previous node’s signature using the previous node’s public key which is extracted from its 
certificate. Thus, it is assured that packets sent during the route discovery are authenticated end-
to-end and only authorized nodes participate at each hop between source and destination. 
Consequently, as in ARAN, data packets exchanged between nodes are not signed and do not 
have attached certificates. Hence, each node simply relays data packets to its successor in the 
route obtained during the route initiation process. Fig. 1 shows the general flowchart of our 
proposed protocol. 
 
3.2 Important Assumptions 
 
We assume (Nn) cooperative nodes in a managed-open environment. These nodes are distributed 
randomly in (Ar×Ar) Km
2
 area and are aware of their positions (equipped with GPS receivers). 
This area will be divided into (Nz) zones; the area of each zone is (Ar×Ar)/Nz km
2
. 
Communication among nodes is done mainly using restricted directional flooding adopting the 
authentication steps used in the ARAN protocol. A particular node in the network is chosen to 
have the software needed to begin the network setup, divide the area into zones and elect the 
initial LCAs. This node is called the Primary Certificate Authority (PCA) server and has the 
private part of the network key (KNET-). All the trusted nodes that will participate in the network 
have a private/public key pair, the public part of the network key (KNET+) and a Common Key 
(CK) which is used for encryption and decryption of the packets sent by non-PCA nodes in the 
network setup phase. In managed-open environments, keys are a priori generated and exchanged 
through an existing relationship between PCA and each trusted node. 
 
3.3 Network Setup 
 
The PCA starts the network setup by broadcasting a packet notifying the nodes of the beginning 
of the NETwork SETup (NETSET). This packet is signed by KNET- to enable nodes to make sure 
that the PCA is actually the node that has sent the packet. Each node found in the network, upon 
receiving the first NETSET packet will record the IP address of the previous node, continue 
broadcasting the packet and  reply with a Node INformation (NIN) packet to the PCA containing 
the node’s IP address (IPA), along with the needed information to elect the LCAs. The NIN 
packets are encrypted using the CK. Each node upon the receipt of a NIN packet will try to 
decrypt it using CK to ensure that its previous node is trusted and to proceed in processing the 
packet; otherwise the packet is dropped. After encrypting the NIN packet, it is sent through the 
reverse path until it reaches the PCA.  
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After receiving the NIN packets from all authorized nodes existing currently in the network, 
PCA will divide the network into multiple equal-sized virtual zones and assign four LCAs for 
each zone.  These LCAs are chosen to be on the zones’ boundaries to make communication 
between LCAs of different zones easier and faster. The network structure is shown in Fig. 2, if 
we suppose that the whole area is divided, for example, into nine zones. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2:  Network structure 
 
After that, the PCA will unicast a Node ROLE message (NROLE) to each participant node. 
Source routing will be used to send these messages since the PCA knows the position of all the 
nodes in the network. These messages will enable each node to know its role in the network 
(LCA or regular node).  
 
Hence, the PCA will unicast a NROLE message for each participating regular node n containing 
node’s certificate (Certn), number of the zone where it resides (z), identities and positions of 
LCAs in its zone (LCAsZz), and the public key that will be used in this zone (KZz+). The node 
certificate (Certn) contains the IP address of n (IPn), the public key of n (Kn+), a timestamp (t) of 
when the certificate was created, and a time (e) at which the certificate expires. These variables 
are concatenated and signed with the KNET-. Nodes use these certificates to authenticate 
themselves to other nodes during the exchange of network maintenance, position and routing 
packets.  
 
The PCA also will unicast a NROLE message for each LCA containing the node’s certificate, 
zone LCAs certificate (CertLZz), the number of that LCA in its zone, the number and coordinates 
of the zone it is responsible for, numbers and coordinates of this zone’s 8-neighboring zones 
(8NbrZZ), private/public key pair that will be used in this zone, identity and position of other 
LCAs in this zone (LCAsZz), identity and position of its adjacent LCA in the neighboring zone, 
public key and part of the private key of the immediate neighboring zone (will be used in the 
case that neighboring zone became empty), and the authentication table. Moreover it will contain 
a list of IP addresses and public keys of authorized nodes that were not in the network during 
network setup (Absent_Nodes); this will enable these nodes to join the network from any zone at 
any time.  
 
The authentication table contains a tuple (IP address, public key, time stamp (t), certificate 
expiration date (e), and position) for each node that is in this zone. It is used to update the nodes’ 
certificates. Also it is used upon receiving a position request packet; LCA checks whether the 
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destination of the route is local or external one; in order to send a position reply packet to the 
source or send position request packet to adjacent zone respectively. 
 
The zone LCA certificate (CertLZz) binds the zone’s number to its public key and contains the 
zone number, zone public key, time stamp and Certificate expiration date. These certificates are 
signed by the zone private key and used by LCAs as a proof that they are LCAs of the specified 
zone. These Certificates are used between LCAs of different zones and between LCAs and nodes 
in their zones during the exchange of network maintenance and position packets.  
 
3.4 Network Maintenance 
 
After the network setup phase, the node can update its certificate, move freely in the network, 
move in and out the network, become corrupted or even destroyed, etc. our protocol should be 
able to cope with these issues.   
 
Since each node by the end of the network setup phase will have its node certificate, these 
certificates can be used to apply the authentication steps used with ARAN protocol. Hence the 
source of any packet will sign the packet using its private key and appends its node certificate to 
the packet. If the source of a packet is an LCA it will also include its zone LCA certificate within 
the packet to enable the destination to make sure that the LCA has a valid certificate for a 
particular zone. Each node along the path validates the previous node’s signature (using the 
previous node’s public key, which is extracted from its certificate), removes the previous node’s 
certificate and signature, signs the original contents of the packet, and appends its own 
certificate. 
 
Another important thing to be mentioned is that the packets sent from the nodes to LCAs of their 
zones is done using restricted directional flooding, since each node within that zone knows the 
position of these LCAs. Also communication between nodes (in the same zone or different 
zones) is done using restricted directional flooding (after obtaining the destination position by 
the source).  Restricted directional flooding is also used for communications among adjacent 
LCAs in neighboring zones (if they are not reachable within one hop). However source routing is 
used to send packets among LCAs of the same zone and from the LCAs to nodes in their zones; 
since these LCAs know the position of all the nodes in their zone.  
 
By default, reply packets are sent through reverse paths of their corresponding request packets. 
Finally, to circumvent voids (regions without nodes) in sparse networks; if the restricted 
directional flooding of a request fails after three attempts, the packet is broadcasted to the whole 
network.  
 
3.4.1 Certifications Update 
 
All nodes in a specific zone must maintain valid certificates with the LCAs in their zone. This is 
done by periodically sending a Certificate REQuest (CREQ) packet to any one of these LCAs, 
however; each node may update its certificate from the nearest LCA to itself to reduce overhead. 
This CREQ packet is signed by the node’s private key and sent using restricted directional 
flooding. Fig. 3, shows the certificate request packets sent for updating Node K’s certificate. 
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Fig. 3: Node K’s certification update 
 
Each intermediate node that receives this CREQ packet sets up a reverse path back to the source 
by recording the neighbor from which it received the packet. This is in anticipation of eventually 
receiving a certificate reply packet that it will need to feedback to the source. The receiving node 
uses public key of the previous hop, which it extracts from its certificate, to validate the 
signature and verify that its certificate has not expired. The receiving node also verifies that it 
has not already processed this CREQ. The receiving node signs the contents of the packet, 
appends its own certificate, and forward broadcasts the packet to its neighbors.  
 
The corresponding LCA upon receiving the first CREQ packet will communicate other LCAs in 
its zone to ask them whether to update this certificate or not. This is done by sending a packet to 
each LCA asking for Acceptance of the Certificate REQuest (ACREQ). So a specific LCA will 
be allowed to issue a certificate only if it receives Acceptance for Certificate REPly (ACREP) 
packet from the majority of the LCAs of that zone (signed by their private keys). This will help 
in increasing the robustness and security of the protocol; if one server fails or is compromised 
the other three servers will still be able to issue valid certificates.  
 
In the case that there are no failed or compromised servers, the LCA will be allowed to issue a 
fresh certificate for the node after receiving at least three ACREP packets (one of them may be 
from itself). Then the LCA will unicast a Certificate REPly (CREP) packet back along the 
reverse path to the source. It also unicasts a Node CERTificate (NCERT) packet to other LCAs 
in its zone containing the new issued certificate (since LCAs inside a specific zone carry 
identical information). 
 
The LCAs also must maintain fresh node and zone LCA certificates. Hence periodically each 
LCA should unicast ACREQ to other LCAs in its zone. Upon receiving the ACREPs it will be 
issued both node and zone LCA certificates. 
3.4.2 Nodes Mobility  
 
If a regular node has moved a pre defined distance (dmov) from its last known position it should 
include its new position in the CREQ packet sent to the nearest LCA in its zone. This LCA will 
in turn send the node’s position to other LCAs in its zone within the ACREQ packet. This will 
help the LCAs keep track of up-to-date positions of the nodes inside the zone and enable them to 
discover that a specific node has departed this zone to the neighboring one.  
 
If the node leaves to one of the immediate 4-neighboring zones, the LCAs of the departed zone 
will remove the node’s information from their tables and the nearest LCA to the new zone will 
send a Departed NODE (DNODE) packet to its adjacent LCA. This packet indicates that this 
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node is trusted and contains the node’s position. Fig. 4 shows the communication done when R 
leaves zone number 5 to zone number 6 (moves from position PR to P’R).  
 
The LCA in the new zone will send a New ZONE (NZONE) packet to the departing node; 
containing the number and public key of the new zone, in addition to IP addresses and positions 
of LCAs of that zone. This LCA also will send multiple New NODE (NNODE) packets to other 
LCAs in its zone informing them about the new node.  
 
Fig. 4: Movement of node R from zone 5 to a 4-neighboring zone 
 
However if the node leaves to one of the diagonal D-neighboring zones, the LCA of the original 
zone will send a DNODE packet to the adjacent LCA in the immediate neighboring zone to 
indicate that this node is trusted. This LCA in turn resends the packet to the LCA adjacent to the 
new D-neighboring zone. The latest will resend this packet to the adjacent LCA in its immediate 
neighboring zone. Now the LCA in the neighboring zone that receives the packet will send an 
NZONE packet to the departing node. This LCA also will send multiple unicasts to other LCAs 
in its zone telling them about the new node. Fig. 5 shows the DNODE and NZONE packets sent 
when node R leaves zone number 5 to zone number 9 (moves from position PR to P’R). 
 
Fig. 5: Movement of node R from zone 5 to a D-neighboring zone 
 
If any LCA has been moved the pre defined distance (dmov) from its last known position, it must 
broadcast its position to the nodes inside its zone (including other LCAs). It also should send its 
position to its adjacent LCA in the neighboring zone. However, an LCA may decide to leave its 
zone, or its distance from the middle point of the zone side may become higher than a pre 
defined distance (dsid). In these two cases a new LCA election is required. Upon deciding to 
leave its zone, the LCA will send a New LCA Election (NLCAE) packet to nodes in its zone. 
Each node in the corresponding zone will calculate its probability by itself to reduce the load on 
the leaving CA. Then each node will send its calculated probability, through reverse path, to the 
leaving LCA. Now the leaving LCA selects the node with the highest probability to become the 
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new LCA. Then it broadcasts a New LCA (NLCA) packet so that all nodes inside that zone 
know the address and position of the new LCA. This information is also sent to the adjacent 
LCA in the neighboring zone through a New Adjacent LCA (NALCA) packet. Now leaving 
LCA transfers to the new LCA the needed information (similar to that included in the NROLE 
message sent from PCA to LCA nodes during network setup phase).  
 
3.4.3 Nodes Failure 
 
The sudden failure of an LCA (or nodes movement outside the network boundaries) can be 
discovered from the periodic LCA zone and node certificates update of LCAs. Hence, if the 
LCAs in a particular zone did not receive the ACREQ packet from a specific LCA in a pre 
determined time they will discover that this LCA has a problem. So, one of these LCAs should 
take the responsibility of electing a new LCA and broadcasting NLCA and NALCA packets 
similar to those sent in the case of LCA nodes mobility.  
 
Subsequently, if the failed LCA has been repaired, it will come back to the network as a regular 
node. To enable this node to join the network from any zone, node’s IP address and public key 
will be sent to all LCAs in the network. Hence each LCA in zone number 5 will send a Failed 
NODE (FNODE) packet to its adjacent LCA in the neighboring zone. The later in turn will send 
it to LCAs in its zone, and so on.  
 
Regular nodes failure also can be discovered from the periodic node certificate update. If an 
LCA had in its Authentication table an expired node certificate, and did not receive a CREQ 
packet within a predefined period of time it will discover that this node has a problem. Then the 
LCA that had issued the last certificate for that node will send a FNODE packet. 
 
3.4.4 Empty Zones  
 
Due to nodes movement, some zones may become empty. When many nodes leave a specific 
zone, the last four nodes stay in that zone will be its four LCAs. If any one of these LCAs wants 
to leave the zone, it should transfer its responsibilities to one of the other LCAs. This will 
continue until the last node in the zone (that plays the role of the four LCAs) decides to leave the 
zone. Upon departing its zone it will send a packet to its adjacent LCA in the zone it is leaving 
for. This packet informs the LCA of the new zone that this node is the last node leaving the zone. 
This Empty ZONE (EZONE) packet will be sent to the 8-neighboring zones (4-neighboring 
zones and D-neighboring zones) of the empty zone informing them that this zone is empty. 
 
Now let us assume that a node leaves a specific zone and enters the empty zone.  The LCA of the 
departed zone knows that this zone is empty, so it will send a packet to the other immediate 
neighboring zones of the empty zone asking them to send the part of the empty zone private key 
that they have.  The LCA of the departed zone, upon receiving these parts will combine them and 
send a packet to the new node informing it that it is the only node in the zone and giving it the 
needed information. The new node will issue to itself the needed certificates and play the role of 
the four LCAs of the zone until other nodes enter. For example, if another node enters this zone 
each one of them will play the role of the two LCAs according to their positions, and so on.  
 
3.4.5 Compromised Nodes 
 
A Scalable and Secure Position-Based Routing Protocols for Ad-Hoc Networks, pp 99-120 
Malaysian Journal of Computer Science, Vol. 22(2), 2009 112 
Our protocol can collaborate with a misbehavior detection system. If regular nodes detect 
misbehavior of other nodes, they will send Misbehavior NODE (MNODE) packets to report this 
to the LCAs of their zones. If the majority of the LCAs in a particular zone have received a 
predefined number of MNODE packets for the same node then they can collaborate and 
broadcast a Compromised NODE (CNODE) packet. So other nodes will exclude this node from 
the routes until its certificate expires normally. 
 
The same technique can be used if the LCAs of a zone detect any misbehavior of a specific LCA 
in that zone; i.e., if three LCAs in a specific zone have detected that the fourth LCA has 
misbehavior actions, they will remove this LCA from the LCAsZz, broadcast a CNODE packet 
and initiate a new LCA election process. 
 
 
3.4.6 Malicious Nodes 
 
Malicious nodes may cause some erratic behaviors such as the use of invalid certificates, 
improperly signed packets, and misuse of some packets. ARANz’s response with regards to all 
erratic behaviors in the same way; dropping all packets that has any erratic behavior. 
 
 
3.4.7 LCAs Synchronization 
 
All the LCAs in the network should have synchronized clocks to ensure the correctness of the 
protocol; to avoid a situation such that two nodes in different zones (or even in the same zone) 
are issued certificates at the same moment with two different time stamps. Hence, the type of 
synchronization needed for our protocol is maintaining relative clocks rather than having the 
clocks synchronized (adjusted) to a reference clock in the network; i.e., nodes run their local 
clocks independently, but keep information about the difference between their clocks and the 
system’s clock so that at any instant the local time of the node can be converted to the system’s 
time. 
 
As a starting point, the PCA may include a time stamp within the NROLE message sent to the 
LCAs during the network setup phase. So each LCA will be able to know the difference between 
its local clock and the LCA’s clock. Also, a time stamp may be included in the information sent 
to a new elected LCA.  
 
Moreover, all clocks are subject to clock drift; as oscillators’ frequency will vary unpredictably 
due to various physical effects [20]. Hence, periodically one of the LCAs may send a message 
containing a time stamp to other LCAs in the network to eliminate the effect of LCAs’ clocks 
drifts.  In order to increase the robustness of the system, the LCAs will alternate this job. Also a 
nonce is used to avoid replay attack. Certainly, the LCA includes its zone LCAs certificate 
within the message, signs the contents of the message, and appends its own certificate.  These 
packets are sent among the LCAs in the same way as the Position REQuest packets (section 3.5).  
 
Regular nodes can use the timestamp included in its certificate to know the system’s time and 
check the validity of the certificates of other nodes; so there is no need for extra communications 
between the LCAs and the regular nodes in a specific zone.  
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3.5 Location Service 
 
Before beginning the route discovery the source should know the destination’s position. The 
source (S) sends a Position REQuest (PREQ) Packet to the nearest LCA in its zone using 
restricted directional flooding to ask the LCA about the position of the destination (D) (refer to 
Fig. 6).  
 
Fig. 6: Authenticated location service 
 
Upon receiving the first PREQ the LCA will check whether the destination is in its zone or not. 
If the destination is in the same zone of the source, the destination will be found in the 
authentication table of the LCA. Hence the LCA will unicast a Position REPly (PREP) Packet to 
the source. This PREP contains the destination’s position and goes back along the reverse path to 
source.  
 
If the destination is in a different zone, the destination will not be found in the authentication 
table of the LCA. So the LCA will send multiple unicast PREQ (using source routing) to the 
other LCAs in its zone that have adjacent LCAs in neighboring zones. Each LCA in that zone 
will send this PREQ to its adjacent LCA in the neighboring zone. Now each LCA in the 
neighboring zones will check if it has received the packet from other LCAs in its zone, and it 
will drop it. Else, it unicasts PREQ to the other LCAs in its zone that have adjacent LCAs in the 
neighboring zones. These steps will be repeated until one of the LCAs (LCA92 in Fig. 6) finds 
the destination in its authentication table. This LCA, in turn, will unicast a PREP back along the 
reverse path to source.  
 
All position discovery steps are done using the authentication steps used with ARAN protocol.  
 
3.6 Route Discovery, Setup and Maintenance 
 
After getting the destination’s position (whether local or external one) the source begins route 
instantiation to destination by sending a Route Discovery Packet (RDP). This is done using 
restricted directional flooding to the source’s neighbors. When the destination receives the first 
RDP it unicasts a Route REPly (RREP) Packet back along the reverse path to the source. All the 
route discovery steps are done using the authentication steps used with ARAN protocol.  
 
ARANz is an on-demand routing protocol; nodes keep track of whether routes are active or not. 
When no data is received on an existing route for that route’s lifetime, the route is simply 
deactivated. Data received on an inactive route causes nodes to generate an ERRor (ERR) 
packet. Nodes also use ERR packets to report links in active routes that are broken due to node 
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movement (as AODV and ARAN, ARANz uses hello messages to the neighbors in order to 
detect possible link failure). All ERR packets must be signed.  
 
3.7 Data Transmission 
 
After finishing the route discovery and setup the source will begin sending the data to the 
destination. As in ARAN, only the control messages between nodes are subject to signing and 
verifying; once the route reply reaches the originator, it is guaranteed that the route found is 
authentic. Thus, data packets exchanged between nodes after a route has been set up are not 
processed by ARANz in any way; they do not have attached certificates and are not signed. Once 
a route is set up, the routing daemon is out of the picture until that route becomes invalid and is 
needed again. However, to ensure data privacy and prevent other trusted nodes from reading the 
data itself, the data may be encrypted using the public key of the destination which the source 
may obtain through the position discovery phase. 
 
4.0 COMPARISON OF PRESENTED PROTOCOLS 
 
Table.1 summarizes the discussed protocols together with the evaluation criteria used. This 
summary is a high level qualitative comparison of the protocols rather than a precise quantitative 
performance evaluation.  
 
As discussed earlier both AODV and ARAN are reactive topology-based routing protocols that 
use broadcasting in the route discovery process; while ARANz is a restricted directional flooding 
position-based routing protocol. AODV does not define any security requirements and inherently 
trusts all participants. On the other hand, ARAN and ARANz use cryptographic certificates to 
prevent most of the attacks against Ad-Hoc routing protocols and detect erratic behavior. Both 
ARAN and ARANz achieve authentication, confidentiality, integrity, non-repudiation, anti-
spoofing as part of a minimal security policy for the ad hoc environment. ARANz, moreover, 
tries to achieve a higher level of security and avoid the single point of attack problem by 
distributing trusts among multiple LCAs. All of the three protocols are loop-free and hence 
preserve the network resources and guarantee the correct operation of the protocol. All of them 
also may be implemented on any network density. 
 
Table.1 Characteristics of the presented protocols. 
Protocols AODV ARAN ARANz 
Performance Parameters 
Type Topology-based (Reactive)  Topology-based (Reactive) Position-based (Restricted 
Directional Flooding) 
Secure No  Yes Yes 
Route Discovery  
 
Broadcasting  
 
Broadcasting Restricted Directional  
Flooding 
Path Selection Least number of hops Quickest Quickest 
Loop Freedom Yes Yes Yes 
Density All All All 
Load Distribution Yes No Yes 
Centralized Trust No Yes (Certificate Authority)  No 
Synchronization No No Yes 
Robustness Medium Medium Medium 
Implementation Complexity Low Medium High 
Scalability Medium Low High 
Packet Overhead Medium High Medium 
Processing Overhead Low Medium Medium 
Route Acquisition Latency Low High  Medium 
Data Packets’ End-to-End delay Medium Medium Medium 
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AODV selects the path with the minimum number of hops. ARAN and ARANz do not guarantee 
the shortest path, but they offer the quickest path which is chosen by the RDP that reaches the 
destination first. Simulations in [4] showed that the average path length for the AODV and 
ARAN are almost identical. This indicates that even though ARAN does not explicitly seek 
shortest paths, the first route discovery packet to reach the destination usually travels along the 
shortest path. Hence ARAN is as effective as AODV in finding the shortest path. It is expected 
for ARANz to be the same.  
 
In ARAN each node should update its certificate from the trusted CA server; hence the load is 
centralized on that CA. This CA also presents a centralized trust and thus may be the system’s 
single point of attack. ARANz, however, tries to distribute load and trust by dividing the area 
into zones and introducing multiple LCAs in each zone. Thus, compromising one LCA will not 
prevent other LCAs from updating the certificates and electing a new LCA to replace the 
compromised one. Using multiple LCAs in ARANz, on the other hand, results in the need to 
keep them synchronized.  
 
AODV and ARAN are more robust in the route discovery phase than ARANz since they 
broadcast the route request to the whole network. ARANz however uses restricted directional 
flooding to discover routes and this may increase the effect of a failure or movement of a single 
node. After setting up the route, the three protocols have the same robustness since the failure of 
an individual node might result in packet loss and the setting up of a new route. ARANz tries to 
achieve higher robustness compared to ARAN by distributing trust among different LCAs; 
multiple LCAs collaborates to issue certificates for the nodes inside a particular zone and work 
as backups of each others.   
 
Hence the failure of a single LCA (or even multiple LCAs) will not affect the update of the 
certificates. However in ARAN the failure of a single node (CA) will prevent all the nodes from 
updating their certificates. After taking these points into consideration the robustness of AODV 
is considered high and those of ARAN and ARANz are considered as medium.  
 
Implementation complexity describes how complex it is to implement and test a particular 
protocol. This measure is highly subjective and we will explain our opinion while discussing 
each protocol. It is very easy to implement the AODV protocol since it is not secure and simply 
broadcasts the RREQ packet to all nodes in the network. ARAN is considered to have medium 
implementation complexity due to certification update and encryption/decryption of the 
messages. Lastly, ARANz has the highest implementation complexity due to its security, dealing 
with the network as zones and introducing multiple LCAs in each zone. 
 
Scalability describes the performance of the protocol with increasing number of nodes in the 
network. The scalability of AODV is considered as medium since its approach can handle 
networks with a reasonable size, but may have problems if it grows due to broadcasting RREQ 
packets. ARAN may have worse performance than AODV in large networks. ARAN assumes 
the existence of one certificate server, which may be the operation bottleneck especially in large 
area networks. Moreover, increasing the number of nodes in the network by using broadcasting 
will increase the packet overhead. Finally, in large area networks the probability of having long 
routes will increase, and since each node spends time in the encryption/decryption of the 
messages, the probability of node movements and route breakage will increase. For these three 
reasons ARAN is considered to have a low scalability. 
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ARANz has high scalability since it will be able to maintain good performance even with large 
networks. This is due to using restricted directional flooding instead of broadcasting, dividing the 
area into zones and distributing load among multiple LCAs. Messages related to location service 
should not highly affect scalability since all of these messages are sent using source routing or 
restricted directional flooding. Even LCA election process is done by broadcasting the NLCAE 
packet to nodes in the intended zone only. 
 
Packet overhead refers to bandwidth consumption due to larger packets and/or higher number of 
signaling packets. AODV has a medium packet overhead because of its small-size packets 
compared to ARAN and ARANz, and increased number of packets due to broadcasting. ARAN 
has a high packet overhead because of the large-size packets due to certificates and signatures 
stored in packets and increased number of packets due to broadcasting. ARANz has a medium 
packet overhead because of the large-size packets due to the security techniques used and 
decreased number of packets compared to AODV and ARAN due to using restricted directional 
flooding. Location service messages should not significantly affect packet overhead (especially 
if the source and destination are in the same zone) since all of these messages are sent using 
source routing or restricted directional flooding. Even LCA election process and certificate 
updates are done locally. 
 
Processing overhead is used to associate each protocol with processing requirements. AODV 
requires a low CPU processing since it is an unsecure protocol. ARAN and ARANz, on the other 
hand, have medium processing overhead due to validating the previous node’s signature, 
removing the previous node’s certificate and signature, signing the original contents of the 
packet, and appending the nodes’ certificate. 
 
Route acquisition latency is an indication of the delay between the sending of a route 
request/discovery packet by a source for discovering a route to a destination and the receipt of 
the first corresponding route reply. Simulations in [4] show that the average route acquisition 
latency for ARAN is approximately double that for AODV due to ARAN’s cryptographic 
operations. It is expected that ARANz will have lower route acquisition latency than ARAN. 
Since ARAN broadcasts the RDP packet, processing RDP packet of other route discovery 
processes by a specific node is delayed until this RDP packet is processed; i.e., increasing other 
routes’ acquisition latencies. ARANz however may limit this problem due to using restricted 
directional flooding. Thus the route acquisition latency is considered as low for AODV, high for 
ARAN, and medium for ARANz. 
 
End-to-end delay of data packets is the delay between the sending of the data packet by the 
source and its receipt at the corresponding receiver. This includes all the delays caused during 
position discovery, route acquisition, buffering and processing at intermediate nodes, and 
retransmission delays at the MAC layer. One may expect that AODV has the lowest end-to-end 
delay since it is not secure, and that ARAN has medium end-to-end delay due to its 
cryptographic operations. Also, it is expected that the highest end-to-end delay is for ARANz 
due to the position discovery process done before performing the authenticated route discovery. 
However, simulations in [4] shows that the end-to-end delay of data packets for the AODV and 
ARAN protocols are almost identical. Although ARAN has higher route acquisition latency, the 
number of route discoveries performed is a small fraction of the number of data packets 
delivered. Hence, the effect of the route acquisition latency on average end-to-end delay of data 
packets is not significant. The processing of data packets is identical when using either protocol, 
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and so the average latency is nearly the same. So the end-to-end delay of data packets is 
considered medium for the three protocols. 
 
5.0 ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The three discussed protocols are loop-free, may be implemented at any network density, 
effective in finding the shortest path, and have almost identical end-to-end delay of data packets.  
 
AODV is a non-secure reactive routing protocol; which reduces its processing overhead. It uses 
broadcasting in the route discovery phase which increases its robustness against nodes’ failure 
during this phase on one hand, and increases its packet overhead and decreases its scalability on 
the other hand. 
  
As AODV, ARAN is a reactive routing protocol that uses broadcasting in the route discovery 
process. However, ARAN uses cryptographic certificates to prevent most of the attacks against 
Ad-Hoc routing protocols and detect erratic behavior. The usage of these certificates increases 
the packet overhead, processing overhead, and route acquisition latency compared to AODV. 
 
ARAN suffers from the centralized trust and load, i.e.; the single point of attack and failure. 
Moreover, it has a scalability problem due to using one certificate server (which may be the 
operation bottleneck), and the increased packet and processing overheads due to broadcasting the 
route request to the whole network along with the  encryption/decryption processes.  
 
ARANz is a secure restricted directional flooding routing protocol that adopts the authentication 
methods used with ARAN. Using restricted directional flooding to discover routes may increase 
the effect of a failure or movement of a single node. However, via dealing with the network as 
zones and using restricted directional flooding, our new model aims to exhibit better scalability 
and performance.  
 
As opposed to ARAN, ARANz tries to distribute load and trust by dividing the area into zones 
and introducing multiple LCAs in each zone. This will help in achieving high level of security 
and robustness, and avoiding the single point of failure and attack problems. Using multiple 
LCAs in ARANz, on the other hand, comes up with a need to keep them synchronized. 
 
It is obvious that ARANz is a scalable protocol since it will be able to maintain a good 
performance even with large networks. This is due to using restricted directional flooding instead 
of broadcasting, dividing the area into zones and distributing load among multiple LCAs.  
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
 
A new model of routing protocol, ARANz, has been proposed in this work. This protocol 
addresses the managed-open environment where the possibility to use already established 
infrastructure is available. ARANz introduces a hierarchical and distributed routing algorithm, 
which improves performance and scalability of the routing protocol by dividing the area into 
zones. ARANz aims to achieve robustness, increases network security and solves the single point 
of failure and attack problems by introducing multiple LCAs. ARANz also tries to exhibit better 
scalability, performance, and robustness against frequent topological changes via the restricted 
directional flooding position-based routing protocols. An overview and a qualitative comparison 
between AODV, ARAN and ARANz protocols have been presented in this paper. 
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7.0 FUTURE WORK 
 
Due to the large number of nodes and the large geographical area of Ad-Hoc networks a 
simulation tool will be used to evaluate and study the performance of the new protocol.  Our next 
tasks are to evaluate the effectiveness of the protocol in dealing with security issues. 
Comparisons will then be performed with existing protocols. We also aim to test ARANz’s 
scalability in relatively high node mobility environment, large area networks, and different 
number of malicious nodes. 
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